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A Class of One: Multiracial Individuals
Under Equal Protection
Desirée D. Mitchell†
When it comes to recognizing multiracial individuals under the Equal Protection Clause, courts have fallen short. Only rarely do courts explicitly identify multiracial plaintiffs as just that—multiracial. Instead, the majority of courts revert to a
“one-drop” rule in which they view plaintiffs as only one part of their self-identified
racial composition. In doing so, the unique identities and experiences of multiracial
individuals remain unaddressed. This Comment builds off previous scholarship by
arguing that courts can and should do better at recognizing multiracial plaintiffs in
equal protection cases by using a “class-of-one” framework. Under that doctrine, the
Supreme Court has held individuals that do not identify with some commonly recognized marginalized class may still assert discrimination claims as a class of one
by alleging that they were treated differently from others similarly situated. Given
our increasingly multiracial society, it is more important than ever that courts play
this vital role in the country’s continued discussions about race by acknowledging
the often-marginalized identities of multiracial individuals.
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My old man’s a white old man
And my old mother’s black.
If ever I cursed my white old man
I take my curses back.
If ever I cursed my black old mother
And wished she were in hell,
I’m sorry for that evil wish
And now I wish her well.
My old man died in a fine big house.
My ma died in a shack.
I wonder where I’m gonna die,
Being neither white nor black?
–LANGSTON HUGHES, “Cross,” in SELECTED POEMS OF
LANGSTON HUGHES 158, 158 (6th ed. 1990).
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, mixed-race Americans have felt a sense of isolation as unique as their racial makeup. Whether society perceived a multiracial person as White or non-White could determine everything from whom they could marry1 to which jobs they
could work2 to which areas and homes they could live in.3 The racially mixed nation that the United States has been since its foundation has resulted in a society in tension with entrenched notions of racial classification. The Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution—passed to promote equality of former slaves—

1
See James R. Browning, Anti-miscegenation Laws in the United States, 1 DUKE
BAR J. 26, 34–35, 37–38 (1951).
2
See German Lopez, Study: Anti-Black Hiring Discrimination Is as Prevalent Today
as It Was in 1989, VOX (Sept. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/Y6SB-W2S8.
3
See Nancy H. Welsh, Racially Restrictive Covenants in the United States: A Call to
Action, 12 AGORA J. URB. PLAN. & DESIGN 130, 132–33 (2018).
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says that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”4 Yet there is reason to
believe multiracial individuals are not offered equal protection
under the law.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts have largely failed in classifying the cases of the multiracial plaintiffs before them. Particularly in the context of White-Black relations during the centurieslong era of anti-miscegenation laws, courts abided by a “one-drop”
rule in which anyone with any traceable amount of Black heritage
was legally considered Black.5 But even since the days in which
anti-miscegenation laws were deemed unconstitutional, courts
have continued to falter in how they see multiracial people for
legal purposes. Historically, courts have simply understood multiracial individuals to be akin to a single minority race of which
they are at least partially composed.6 For instance, in the infamous race-based case Plessy v. Ferguson,7 the Supreme Court accepted the notion that the plaintiff—a man who was “seveneighths Caucasian and one-eighth African blood”—was, for all legal purposes, Black.8 Because of this limited understanding of racial identity, the legal system has largely failed to identify multiracial plaintiffs as they identify themselves, leaving many
plaintiffs feeling unrecognized and alienated from society.9
Seeking to address this problem, some scholars have written
about how courts might consider the multiracial identities of
plaintiffs in ways such as ceasing to require some identification
with a recognized racial category.10 Professor Taunya Lovell
Banks, for instance, has joined scholars like Professors Nancy
Leong11 and Lauren Sudeall Lucas12 in arguing that the law
should recognize individuals’ very personal multiracial

4

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1174, 1187 (1997).
6
Id. at 1174; see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial
Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J.
1967, 1976 (1989) (“In Virginia, there were only three racial classifications of any legal
significance. . . . Those three were ‘white,’ ‘Indian,’ and ‘Negro and mulatto.’”).
7
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8
Id. at 541.
9
See Nancy Leong, Judicial Erasure of Mixed-Race Discrimination, 59 AM. U. L.
REV. 469, 535–36 (2010).
10 See, e.g., id. at 549.
11 See id. at 546–48.
12 See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? Reconciling Multiracial Identity with
Equal Protection, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1277–79 (2014).
5
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identities.13 Relatedly, scholars like Professor John Tehranian
and Bijan Gilanshah have called for a more fluid understanding
of race under equal protection doctrine.14 This Comment largely
builds off those arguments by asserting that courts should recognize multiracial plaintiffs as just that—multiracial. In doing so, I
suggest that courts should adopt a mindset in which they use a
framework similar to the recognized “class-of-one” equal protection doctrine.
The class-of-one doctrine allows an individual to be recognized as a class of her own for equal protection purposes. Through
this doctrine, courts have been receptive to the argument that an
individual who does not identify with a recognized class has nevertheless been subject to unlawful discrimination in need of judicial review. I argue the unique experience of multiracial individuals should allow them to allege discrimination because of their
membership within a class of one. This option would be fitting in
the context of plaintiffs who are not monoracial because the multiracial experience varies significantly by racial makeup and selfidentification. It is those experiences that are worthy of recognition by courts.
Consider the following hypothetical example given by Leong:
A plaintiff claims that he was discriminated against because
he was Asian. He alleges that his coworkers called him a
“chink,” asked him whether he ate dogs, and mocked the
shape of his eyes. He was ultimately fired for what he believes were pretextual reasons masking racial animus. The
first sentence of the court’s opinion is as follows: “Plaintiff
alleges that he was discriminated against because he is Hispanic.” Undoubtedly, this plaintiff would feel that the court
had disregarded his narrative. Not only did the court characterize him in a way that he had not characterized himself,
but the way in which the court characterized him divests the
other facts of their narrative impact because they are not associated with the category of “Hispanic” as they are with the
category of “Asian.” My example is intentionally exaggerated,
and the Reader’s reaction is likely that the court’s characterization was simply wrong. But that is exactly the point: just
13 See Taunya Lovell Banks, Multiracial Malaise: Multiracial as a Legal Racial Category, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2783, 2791–92 (2018).
14 See generally John Tehranian, Changing Race: Fluidity, Immutability, and the
Evolution of Equal-Protection Jurisprudence, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2019); Bijan Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the Color Line, 12 LAW & INEQ. 183 (1993).
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as an Asian plaintiff may believe it to be wrong for a court to
characterize him as Hispanic, a multiracial plaintiff may feel
it was wrong for a court to characterize him as monoracial.15
A half-White, half-Black individual will have experiences of
discrimination that differ in nature from the discrimination experienced by an individual who identifies as Black, White, Hispanic,
or Asian. While these differences may not result in differing legal
outcomes (meaning a multiracial plaintiff who is wrongly identified as monoracial may still succeed in her claim, irrespective of
the court’s error), each plaintiff before a court will still be unique
and deserving of recognition. Further, as illustrated by Leong’s
example, to be meaningfully effective, courts must make an effort
to truly understand the situations of claimants. Consequently,
multiracial plaintiffs should have the option of having their
unique discrimination claims heard and recognized as a class
of one.
As described, articles chronicling the unique experiences of
mixed-race individuals are not new. For the purposes of this Comment, I define “mixed-race” or “multiracial” individuals as anyone
who identifies with more than one race.16 In Part I of this Comment, I explore the history of multiracial individuals in the
United States, including how society, and courts specifically, have
classified mixed-race people. Part II then describes existing equal
protection jurisprudence and how it has historically applied to
multiracial people. I describe how courts have traditionally
lumped multiracial individuals with other, clearer minority racial
groups and ignored the unique identities of multiracial people.
The Comment then goes on in Part III to exemplify the harms
multiracial individuals face under current equal protection doctrine. Most notably, I argue multiracial individuals are subject to
15

Leong, supra note 9, at 535 (emphasis in original).
The U.S. Census identifies five main groups of races: “White,” “Black or African
American,” “American Indian or Alaska Native,” “Asian,” and “Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander.” Race: About, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/M6WR-XBUU (last
updated Jan. 23, 2018). It is also worth noting that under the U.S. Census, “Hispanic or
Latino” is not a racial category but an ethnic one. About Hispanic Origin, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://perma.cc/BRZ6-RCTZ (last updated Oct. 16, 2020). Concededly, there is no
general consensus as to whether “Hispanic or Latino” should be considered a racial group.
For the purposes of this Comment, I perceive a Hispanic or Latinx-identifying multiracial
plaintiff as one who would qualify as “multiracial” before a court. That is, a plaintiff who
identifies as half-White and half-Hispanic could be considered multiracial, despite the fact
that the Census would only classify her racially as “White.” See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera &
Mark Hugo Lopez, Is Being Hispanic a Matter of Race, Ethnicity or Both?, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(June 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/937U-9A67.
16
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isolation because of their “confused” identity and are subject to
discrimination because of their multiracial composition itself, as
opposed to the presence of some non-White heritage. Additionally,
I discuss the psychological and symbolic significance of recognizing—or failing to recognize—multiracial identity. Finally, in
Part IV, I discuss courts’ use of the class-of-one doctrine under
equal protection and how its use could speak to the unique harms
multiracial individuals face that are unaddressed under current
application of equal protection.
I. MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Social History and the One-Drop Rule
Because a mixed person embodies that rebuke to the logic of
the system, race-mixing becomes a crime worse than treason.17
The existence of multiracial people in the United States extends as long as U.S. history itself, even though the regularity of
multiracial recognition is a relatively recent phenomenon. Perhaps in line with the reality that the U.S. Census only began permitting respondents to select more than one race in 2000,18 multiracial individuals in the United States have been misclassified as
an unclassifiable “other” for centuries. This Section proceeds by
broadly examining the history of multiracial people in America,
beginning as early as the pre–Revolution Era through to the
twentieth century and its corresponding developments for multiracial America. As discussed in greater depth in Part II.A, it is
this social and legal history of multiracialism that has played a
role in how multiracial individuals have been and should be
viewed for equal protection purposes. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court employs varying levels of judicial scrutiny in equal protection cases depending on the type of classification made. When a
classification involves a racial group—like multiracial people—
the Court exercises greater scrutiny in examining that
classification.19

17

TREVOR NOAH, BORN A CRIME 21 (2016).
Faye Fiore, Multiple Race Choices to Be Allowed on 2000 Census, L.A. TIMES (Oct.
30, 1997), https://perma.cc/6CVS-L9R8.
19 See infra Part II.A.
18
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1. Mixed-race persons in early U.S. history.
Records from as early as the seventeenth century document
common practices of miscegenation between indentured servants
of White European and Black African descent.20 In early America,
those with parents of different races—typically one with lighter
skin and one with darker skin—were called “mulattoes.” Because
of their mixed ancestry, these individuals were considered lowerclass citizens and denied classification among those who were
“purely” White, regardless of how obvious their Black heritage
was.21 As a result of society’s general hostility toward racial mixing, the nation’s first anti-miscegenation law was passed in Maryland in 1661, criminalizing marriage between White women and
Black men.22 For all legal purposes, many mixed-race people—
including those with any small but cognizable number of nonWhite ancestors—were classified as simply Black.23
This harsh one-drop rule was, at the time, essential in maintaining the social, political, economic, and psychological structures on which white supremacy was so dependent.24 For centuries, a racial hierarchy persisted in which non-White individuals
(broadly including those with even one drop of known non-White
blood) were systematically subordinated by their White counterparts.25 As explained by historian Paul R. Spickard, for mixedrace people,
[t]he function of the one-drop rule was to solidify the barrier
between Black and White, to make sure that no one who
might possibly be identified as Black also became identified
as White. For a mixed person, then, acceptance of the onedrop rule mean[t] internalizing the oppression of the dominant group, buying into the system of racial domination.26

20 Rainier Spencer, New Racial Identities, Old Arguments: Continuing Biological Reification, in MIXED MESSAGES: MULTIRACIAL IDENTITIES IN THE “COLOR-BLIND” ERA 83,
89–90 (David L. Brunsma ed., 2006).
21 See Hickman, supra note 5, at 1173.
22 Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, in MIXED RACE AMERICA AND THE
LAW: A READER 11, 11 (Kevin R. Johnson ed., 2003).
23 See Hickman, supra note 5, at 1174–79.
24 See id. at 1175–77.
25 See C.J. Fuller, Caste, Race, and Hierarchy in the American South, 17 J. ROYAL
ANTHRO. INST. 604, 607–08 (2011).
26 Paul R. Spickard, The Illogic of American Racial Categories, in RACIALLY MIXED
PEOPLE IN AMERICA 12, 19 (Maria P.P. Root ed., 1992).
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However, even given the clear purposes of the racist one-drop
rule, racial categorization in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
America bore its flaws early on. Between the many scientific and
social views on race at the time, courts’ logic in their racial categorizations was muddled and contradictory. In one opinion, Judge
Spencer Roane of Virginia declared that “[t]he distinguishing
characteristics of the different species of the human race are so
visibly marked, that those species may be readily discriminated
from each other by mere inspection only.”27 That assumption later
proved wildly untrue. Still, because of this confused and rigid organization of races, society classified most Black and multiracial
individuals as non-White, while mistakenly classifying a narrow
few as White because of their ability to pass as such. For, as conceded by Judge Roane in Hudgins v. Wright,28 once races “intermingled,” it became difficult, or even impossible, to distinguish
White from Black.29
2. Multiracial developments in the twentieth century.
Unquestionably, the number of multiracial people in the
United States grew significantly in the twentieth century.30 This
spike was due, at least in part, to the landmark legal developments of that century. Decisions holding that racial segregation
and bans on interracial marriages were unconstitutional set the
stage for more multiracial children and a consequential change in
social perceptions regarding multiracialism.
It was not until nearly a century after the emancipation of all
Black people in the United States that the Supreme Court ruled
in its landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education31 that racial
segregation within schools was inherently unequal.32 Subsequently, as a result of the flood of legal and political changes regarding race during the Civil Rights Era, the Court held in Loving
v. Virginia33 that laws prohibiting interracial marriage violated
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth

27

Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. 134, 141 (1806).
11 Va. 134 (1806).
29 Id. at 141.
30 Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Rich Morin & Mark Hugo Lopez, Multiracial in America: Proud, Diverse, and Growing in Numbers, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11,
2015), https://perma.cc/TR3Q-VPKQ.
31 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32 Id. at 495.
33 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
28
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Amendment.34 Unlike the Brown decision, the Loving decision
was widely acknowledged by all and deemed final. As Professor
Randall Kennedy noted, “opponents of Loving were unable to
mount anything like a massive resistance.”35
In issuing its decision in Loving, the Court rejected the prevailing notions of racial purity and white supremacy. For the first
time, the Supreme Court made clear that the intermixing of races
was not a defect.36 Understandably, the decades following the decision resulted in an increase in multiracial unions—in addition
to an unsurprising increase in multiracial babies. Recent studies
have found that interracial marriages have increased fivefold
since Loving,37 and, relatedly, the proportion of multiracial babies
born in the United States has increased from 1%38 to 14%.39 That
is, about one in every seven babies born in the nation is multiracial! Especially in recent decades, multiracial individuals have
become more prominent in the public sphere—from entertainment40 to sports41 to politics.42 And with the increase in diversity
in the United States, there is reason to expect only an upward
trend of multiracial unions and children.

34 Id. at 12. Those clauses of the Constitution require, respectively, that states shall
neither “deny to any person within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”
nor “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
35 RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION 278 (1st ed. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).
36 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11–12.
37 Gretchen Livingston & Anna Brown, Intermarriage in the U.S. 50 Years After Loving v. Virginia, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/YRB3-8SGH.
38 Parker et al., supra note 30.
39 Gretchen Livingston, The Rise of Multiracial and Multiethnic Babies in the U.S.,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/KU9N-GSLF.
40 For example, actress-turned-princess Meghan Markle has been open about her
mixed-race heritage. See Meghan Markle, I’m More Than An ‘Other’, ELLE (Dec. 22, 2016),
https://perma.cc/6TD3-8URL.
41 Golf legend Tiger Woods, for instance, has self-described as “Cablinasian” (a mix
of Caucasian, Black, Indian, and Asian). Gary Younge, Tiger Woods: Black, White, Other,
THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2010), https://perma.cc/5ZDU-4PA3.
42 Within the past four years, numerous multiracial individuals have run for (or
been) president of the United States. Following former-President Barack Obama’s (halfWhite and half-Black) time in office, Vice President Kamala Harris (half-Indian and halfBlack) and Senator Cory Booker (mainly Black with White ancestry) were only two of
many multiracial presidential candidates for the 2020 election. See Astead W. Herndon &
Jonathan Martin, Democrats Have the Most Racially Diverse Field Ever. The Top Tier Is
All White., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/9DLF-HGCY.
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B. Legal History and the Development of Racial Classification
In the 1949 movie, Pinky, Jeanne Crain (a White woman)
plays Pinky Johnson, a light-skinned, possibly mixed woman,
who returns to the South after “passing” and spending time studying nursing in the North as a White woman.43 While in the
North, she is perceived as fair skinned enough that a relationship
ensues with a White doctor who is unaware of her Black ancestry.
Contrastingly, in the South, community members who know her
true identity routinely harass her. When Pinky heads to court to
fight for her property rights, the community ridicules and discounts her efforts against a (seemingly) White relative. At one
point in the film, Pinky says, “I’m a Negro. I can’t forget it, and I
can’t deny it. I can’t pretend to be anything else, and I don’t want
to be anything else. Don’t you see?” As misguided as the film was
in many aspects, it succeeded in some notable respects. Though
Pinky’s actual racial composition is unknown to viewers, there is
still a clear understanding of the fragility and fickleness of racial
classifications. In one social setting—a nursing school in the
North—society perceives Pinky as White, and she enjoys the
same privileges as any other White person. But in the South, society harasses, demeans, and challenges Pinky because of her ancestry, particularly within the legal context. Albeit fictional,
Pinky’s story exemplifies well some of the unique experiences of
multiracial people as they have historically endured racial
categorization.
As previously noted, general racial classification within the
United States has tended to follow a one-drop rule, especially as
it relates to White-Black mixed individuals.44 However, despite
the one-drop rule, courts (and society at large) have routinely
struggled throughout history to accurately and meaningfully create racial classifications, particularly as they pertained to mixedrace individuals. Often, certain “defining” characteristics such as
facial complexion, hair texture, and nose width helped to determine one’s ancestry.45 In other cases, so-called experts’ extensive
knowledge helped to demonstrate a particular individual’s race
under racist statutory regimes.46

43

PINKY (20th Century Fox 1949).
See Hickman, supra note 5, at 1174–80.
45 See Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1994).
46 See Hickman, supra note 5, at 1228–30.
44
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Before the enactment of statutory regimes dictating a person’s race, courts were left to their own devices in determining the
race of the parties before them. In the nineteenth-century case
Thurman v. State,47 the defendant was convicted of the rape of a
White woman and the court was forced to determine whether (for
the purpose of punishment) the mixed-race defendant would be
considered White or Black.48 The implications of that determination were severe: the law declared, “Every slave, free negro, or
mulatto, who shall commit, or attempt to commit the crime of
rape on any White female, and be thereof convicted, shall suffer
death,”49 but Whites who committed the same crime were only
subject to imprisonment.50 The court determined that, despite
Thurman’s “kinky hair and yellow skin,” the fact that his mother
was White and his father was a mulatto made him “white”—at
least under that law.51 In another case from 1866, People v.
Dean,52 another Black-White mixed-race defendant was charged
with illegally voting as a “white man.”53 In addressing the difficulties of ascribing race based on physical characteristics alone,54
the court held that a person like the defendant was, under the
relevant state constitution, “white” so long as he had less than
one-fourth of African blood.55
The difficulty felt by the courts in Thurman and Dean in defining race became widely addressed by legislatures hoping to
simplify the task of racial classification. Most commonly, states
enacted laws measuring race by a blood quantum standard or
mathematical fraction of racial blood.56 Some states, like Virginia,
passed laws strictly defining “whiteness” as having “no trace
47

18 Ala. 276 (1850).
Id. at 278.
49 Id. at 278–79 (quotation marks omitted).
50 See C.C. Clay, Penal Code—Offenses Against the Person, in A DIGEST OF LAWS OF
THE STATE OF ALABAMA § 14, at 414 (Marmaduke J. Slade 1843).
51 Thurman, 18 Ala. at 278–79 (quotation marks omitted).
52 14 Mich. 406 (1866).
53 Id. at 413–14.
54 Id. at 422–23 (“There are white men as dark as mulattoes, and there are pure
blooded Albino Africans as white as the whitest Saxons.”).
55 Id. at 425.
56 See Destiny Peery, (Re)Defining Race: Addressing the Consequences of the Law’s
Failure to Define Race, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1817, 1839–40 (2017). Interestingly, many of
these statutes have only very recently been repealed. For example, in Louisiana, a statute
defining race under a mathematical formula was not repealed until 1983, and even then,
lawmakers faced pushback from critics who called the change in law “obscene.” See
Frances Frank Marcus, Louisiana Repeals Black Blood Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 1983),
https://perma.cc/8S5E-SV97 (quotation marks omitted).
48
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whatsoever of any blood other than Caucasian.”57 Most, however,
opted for more lenient standards of Whiteness, deeming those
with less than one-eighth Black blood as White.58 This approach
to racial classification gave courts the appearance of rationality
and objectivity, but it also aided in supporting racist ideology
through “scientific” evidence.59
Nevertheless, this seemingly simple approach to racial identity proved to be just as difficult to utilize, particularly for prosecutors and plaintiffs who were burdened with proving the racial
fractions of defendants.60 For instance, in Ferrall v. Ferrall,61 the
plaintiff, a White male, sought to have his marriage to a mixedrace woman declared legally void on the grounds that she was
Black.62 Ultimately, the court ruled for the defendant, finding that
the plaintiff failed to prove that his wife was “negro” per the statutory definition of one-eighth Black.63 Relatedly, in Knight v.
State,64 a mixed-race man’s conviction for unlawfully marrying a
White woman was reversed because the state could not “prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant had one-eighth or
more Negro blood.”65
To aid in the challenging task of proving racial identities,
courts sometimes deferred to the knowledge of scientific experts.66
In Daniel v. Guy,67 for example, an expert testified regarding the
physical makings of a “negro”—“negro hair[,] . . . [which] never
becomes straight until after the third descent from the negro” and
“[t]he flat nose[, which] remains observable for several descents.”68 The court there affirmed the use of such scientists, determining that “[i]f they were skilled in the natural history of the
races of men, it was competent for them to state the distinguishing marks between the negro and the white race.”69

57 Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-miscegenation Statute in
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1202 (1966).
58 See Peery, supra note 56, at 1839–40.
59 Id. at 1840.
60 See Hickman, supra note 5, at 1226–27.
61 69 S.E. 60 (N.C. 1910).
62 Id. at 60–61.
63 Id. at 61–62.
64 42 So. 2d 747 (Miss. 1949).
65 Id. at 748.
66 See Hickman, supra note 5, at 1228–30.
67 19 Ark. 121 (1857).
68 Id. at 127.
69 Id. at 136.
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In essence, courts—and society more generally—have historically been in the business of (often wrongfully) making racial
classifications.70 Yet as explained later in Parts II and III, this
phenomenon still exists, albeit in a less conspicuous fashion.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND MULTIRACIAL INDIVIDUALS
Beyond social, legislative, and judicial attempts at racial categorization more broadly, the Constitution loomed large over how
race was to be treated under the law. Shortly after the end of the
Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified together with
the other Reconstruction Amendments, guaranteeing equal protection to recently freed slaves by declaring that “[n]o State shall
. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”71 Despite this command, however, the law remained—and still remains—far from clear as to how exactly multiracial individuals would properly fit within that equal protection
doctrine.
A. General Development of Equal Protection Jurisprudence
Following the highly controversial Lochner Era72 of the early
twentieth century, the Supreme Court held in 1938 that any law
targeted against “particular religious, or national, or racial minorities [or] . . . discrete and insular minorities . . . which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities . . . may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”73 This wellknown phrasing in footnote four of the United States v. Carolene
Products Co.74 opinion subsequently catalyzed modern equal protection jurisprudence in two distinct respects: first, as it related
70 For an interesting and more extensive analysis of courts’ struggled attempts to define parties’ races and determine who could permissibly be categorized as White, see IAN
HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 163–68 (10th ed. 2008).
71 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72 During the Lochner Era, the Court controversially struck down state economic
policies “based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for the State to
implement considered policies.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also generally Stephen A. Siegel,
Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons From the Controversy over Railroad and Utility
Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984) (describing and criticizing the Supreme Court’s
holdings and method of judicial interpretation during this period).
73 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted).
74 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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to standards of judicial review in discrimination cases and second,
in determining which types of individuals—or, more accurately,
groups of people—would call for review of laws applying to them
with strict scrutiny. For those who belonged to minority groups
that were “discrete and insular” enough (like a minority racial
group), any government classification based on membership in
that group would need to “serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest,” in
order to survive strict scrutiny.75 Where the Court determined
that the plaintiffs did not qualify for strict scrutiny because they
could not meet the group requirement, the Court would defer to
the legislative branch’s decision if the classification furthered
some rational state interest.76
Regarding the cases that would call for strict scrutiny and a
“more searching judicial inquiry,” the Court, in subsequent decades, struggled to concretely define qualifying minority groups.
In the 1970s, Supreme Court justices voiced the idea that a “discrete and insular minority” is one whose group members are identifiable by a characteristic that they are powerless to change,77
and that classifications based on race, nationality, or alienage
would be considered highly suspect.78 Almost fifty years after the
famous Carolene Products footnote was written, Justice Lewis
Powell explained it in the following way:
The theory properly extracted from Footnote 4 . . . is roughly
as follows: The fundamental character of our government is
democratic. Our constitution assumes that majorities should
rule and that the government should be able to govern.
Therefore, for the most part, Congress and the state legislatures should be allowed to do as they choose. But there are
certain groups that cannot participate effectively in the political process. And the political process therefore cannot be
75

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). Importantly, this lower level of
judicial scrutiny has typically been fatal to plaintiffs. As described by one court:
76

[T]he rational basis test is enormously deferential to the government, and only
rarely have laws been declared unconstitutional for failing to meet this level of
review. Under rational basis scrutiny, statutory discrimination will not be set
aside if any set of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify its discrimination.
Bowman v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1067 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
77 Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 18 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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trusted to protect these groups in the way it protects most of
us. Consistent with these premises, the theory continues, the
Supreme Court has two special missions in our scheme of
government:
First to clear away impediments to participation, and ensure
that all groups can engage equally in the political process; and
Second, to review with heightened scrutiny legislation inimical to discrete and insular minorities who are unable to protect themselves in the legislative process.79
While this insight was helpful in determining which groups
would be considered discrete and insular, it was still unclear
where the line should be drawn in deciding who was deserving of
extra judicial scrutiny.
Perhaps as a result of the difficulty in determining which
groups were discrete and insular enough for extra judicial protection, courts began using other factors to measure “suspectness.”80
In Mathews v. Lucas,81 for example, the Court considered the immutability of being a child born out of wedlock and held that such
a characteristic ultimately did not call for strict scrutiny.82 Accordingly, the Court deferred to the rational decision made by the
government to deny benefits to certain children born out of wedlock.83 Ten years later in Lyng v. Castillo,84 the Court refused to
find that a “class” of close relatives (or “household[s]”) was a discrete and insular minority in need of increased judicial protection
because there was no history of discrimination for that category
of individuals.85 Finally, in Frontiero v. Richardson,86 the Court
considered the group’s political powerlessness and general ability
to contribute to society in assessing whether a case called for
strict scrutiny.87 These factors—immutability, history of discrimination, political powerlessness, and ability to contribute to society (along with others)—played and, to a certain extent, continue

79 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1088–
89 (1982).
80 See Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
135, 148, 150–68 (2011).
81 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
82 Id. at 506.
83 Id. at 510–11.
84 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
85 Id. at 638.
86 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
87 See id. at 686 n.17.
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to play a role in courts’ attempts to define discrete and insular
classes.88
For the purposes of this Comment, it is important to establish
that almost unquestionably courts would find that multiracial individuals are a discrete and insular group deserving of some form
of extra judicial protection (through strict scrutiny). While a multiracial person (for example, half-Black and half-White) may be politically represented by people with interests serving both races,
it is unclear that multiracial individuals as a distinct group are
adequately protected in their unique interests. Also, while there
is no racial “cohesion” among multiracial individuals as a group,
they are distinguishable in that they identify as more than one
race. This, in turn, poses unique constraints upon them. Further,
the Supreme Court has consistently found that any racial classification—including as applied to multiracial people—by the government is inherently suspect and is subject to a higher level of
scrutiny.89
B. Court Recognition of Multiracial Plaintiffs for Equal
Protection Purposes
Despite the fact that multiracial plaintiffs fall within a protected class for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, formal judicial
recognition of multiracial plaintiffs’ specific identity is uncommon.90 This is likely because, as recognized by Professor Leong,
88

See Strauss, supra note 80, at 148–68.
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); see
also Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
90 See Leong, supra note 9, at 510:
89

Plaintiffs explicitly identified as multiracial or biracial are a rarity within antidiscrimination jurisprudence. Searching Westlaw for federal cases brought
within the past two decades yielded only three Equal Protection claims and five
Title VII claims brought by explicitly identified mixed-race plaintiffs. All were
district court cases, and five of the eight were unpublished.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, though, court recognition of multiracial plaintiffs seems to be
slightly more common than in the year 2010, when Professor Leong’s article was published. A search on Westlaw using Leong’s terms for only the years 2018 and 2019 revealed
an additional seven cases in which the court explicitly recognized the plaintiff as being
multiracial in an equal protection case. As Leong found, however, the majority of these
cases were at the district court level. Only one in those two years took place at the appellate level. See generally Robinson v. Perales, 894 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2018); Richard v.
Dignean, 332 F.R.D. 450 (W.D.N.Y. 2019); A.A. v. Ill. Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 18-cv-0098,
2019 WL 4750538 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2019); Czerwinski v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. and
Cmty. Supervision, 394 F. Supp. 3d 210 (N.D.N.Y. 2019); Springs v. City of New York,
No. 17-CV-451, 2019 WL 1429567 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019); Martin v. Dotson, No. 16-cv58, 2019 WL 1140224 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2019); Beecham v. Roseville City Sch. Dist.,
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“courts have generally lumped individuals identified as multiracial together with other members of conventional categories,
reformulating the narrative of discrimination of those identified
as multiracial to avoid disruption of the prevailing racial classification scheme.”91 Further, and importantly, for many equal protection cases, the exact racial makeup of the plaintiff does not
matter. As the Court explained, “When a classification denies an
individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background, it must be regarded as suspect.”92 In practice, that means that a judge may not need to recognize a multiracial plaintiff as multiracial to find that she was
impermissibly treated differently because of her race (whatever
race that is) under the Fourteenth Amendment. Judges can ascribe to the status quo of monoracialism without negatively affecting the outcomes of some multiracial plaintiffs’ cases because
it is largely just viewed as background information. Still, these
possible explanations do little to diminish the fact that throughout American history, judges have largely ignored the personal
racial identities of innumerable multiracial plaintiffs.
In the most telling example of this tendency of the courts, a
plaintiff in one case who self-identified as a “multiracial person of
Black, Native American, Jewish and Anglo descent” was unsuccessful in bringing a discrimination claim against his employer,
perhaps due in part to the fact that the court refused to recognize
his claim as one particularly of a multiracial person.93 In refusing
to do so, the court said that it would be “impracticable to apply
and could be so self-limiting that a particular person is the only
identifiable member of the group.”94 Even more, assuming court
recognition of the plaintiff as multiracial would not have changed
the legal outcome in this case, the plaintiff was still worse off because the court refused to recognize him as he saw himself.

No. 15-CV-01022, 2018 WL 1941670 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018). Even acknowledging the
growth in recognition of multiracial plaintiffs, however, the recognition is still minimal
and has yet to account for how a multiracial plaintiff’s felt discrimination is unique precisely because they are multiracial.
91 Leong, supra note 9, at 511; see also Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Review Essay, Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747, 774 (1994) (“Criteria that we use loosely
in daily life can become rigid tests in the courtroom.”).
92 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978) (emphasis added).
93 Walker v. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of Regents, CIV. A. No. 90-M-932, 1994 WL 752651,
at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994); see also Leong, supra note 9, at 511–12.
94 Walker, 1994 WL 752651, at *1.
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Between 2000 and 2019, federal district courts, collectively,
recognized multiracial plaintiffs fewer than forty times in equal
protection cases. This is noteworthy considering that a Westlaw
search of all equal protection cases during that same time period
produces almost ten thousand results.95 Even more stark, the totality of federal appellate courts in the United States have only
recognized multiracial individuals in three equal protection
cases.96 A discussion of all forty-two federal multiracial equal protection cases would be impractical for a Comment of this scope.
Still, the following discussion of the three federal appellate cases
illustrates the often insufficient approaches taken by courts in
fully recognizing multiracial plaintiffs, even in the rare cases
when the plaintiffs’ racial identity is explicitly mentioned.
In the first case, Marshall v. Mayor and Alderman of Savannah,97 the plaintiff, Tiffany Marshall, sued her former employer under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause after she
was fired.98 While the plaintiff had initially sued alleging racial
discrimination, the lower court had dismissed that claim because
the plaintiff did not file with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission or address the issue in the response to the motion for
summary judgment.99 In fact, the appellate court only mentioned
the plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim as part of the procedural
history and only described her mixed-race identity in a footnote.100
In the second case, the plaintiff, Carla Karlen, sued a local
school on behalf of herself and her two children, claiming they had
been discriminated against because of their respective races.101
Here, the court mentioned the possibility that one child had been
discriminated against because she was biracial (or, rather mentioned that the child’s father had framed this possibility) but
95 To identify these cases, I conducted the following search in Westlaw based on
Leong’s previous searches on the same issue: (biracial multiracial “mixed race” “racially
mixed”) & (“equal protection”) & DA(aft 01/01/1990) & DA(bef 12/31/2019). I then filtered
the results to only include cases in federal district courts. This search yielded 265 cases.
After examining each case, I determined 39 equal protection claims explicitly identified
the plaintiff as multiracial.
96 I conducted the following search in Westlaw: (biracial multiracial “mixed race”
“racially mixed”) & (“equal protection”) & DA(aft 01/01/1990) & DA(bef 12/31/2019). I then
filtered the results to only include cases in the Supreme Court or federal courts of appeals.
This search yielded 103 cases. After examining each case, I determined only 3 explicitly
identified the plaintiff as multiracial.
97 366 F. App’x 91 (11th Cir. 2010).
98 Id. at 96.
99 Id. at 96–97.
100 Id. at 96 n.4.
101 Karlen v. Landon, 503 F. App’x 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2012).
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ended the analysis there because of a lack of factual support.102 In
this case, although the court did not engage in an analysis of
whether the child’s mixed racial identity was key in the discrimination, it at least seemed to note the possibility that it was the
case.103
Finally, in the most recent case the search yielded, Robinson
v. Perales,104 the plaintiff, Anthony Robinson, sued his former supervisor for racial discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause.105 Near the beginning of the opinion, the court briefly
made mention of Robinson’s biracial self-identification; however,
the inquiry into this aspect of the plaintiff ended there.106 Perhaps
due to the nature of the case and available facts, the court only
examined the effect of the plaintiff’s claims that he had been repeatedly subjected to racial epithets and intimidation tactics typically associated with Black or African American individuals.107
While this case may be an example of ignorance by the court in
being unwilling to truly understand the experiences of multiracial people, it might just as likely be one in which the plaintiff
was discriminated against because of his perceived race rather
than his self-identified race, so his multiracial identity was irrelevant.
Importantly, however, these cases emphasize a too-common
practice in courts: In none of these appellate-level cases did the
court satisfactorily recognize the plaintiff’s multiracial identity
and assess whether it might have played a role in the plaintiff’s
racial discrimination case. Regardless of whether recognition
would have made a difference in what the plaintiff could recover,
lack of recognition was at least harmful in that it denied a basic
right of any person—acknowledgment.
III. UNADDRESSED MULTIRACIAL HARM
The lack of recognition of multiracial people in courts has undoubtedly led to adverse effects upon those plaintiffs. By failing
to recognize multiracial plaintiffs as multiracial, courts—ironically—discriminate against plaintiffs whose discriminatory
claims they seek to address. Anti-miscegenation laws probably
102
103
104
105
106
107

See id. at 47.
See id.
894 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 823, 825.
See id. at 823.
Id. at 823–26.
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first arose in the 1600s,108 and at one point, thirty-eight states had
laws banning interracial relations.109 As a consequence of these
long-standing ideas, some people, even today, may be reluctant to
accept interracial relationships and the children that are a consequence of them.110 The negative historical perceptions of racial
mixing mean that many multiracial individuals feel ostracized by
groups in which they only partially belong.111 Perhaps the question most often heard by multiracial individuals is, “What are
you?” While seemingly harmless, this question is, in a way, representative of the discriminatory experiences faced by multiracial
people. Because they lack membership in one clear category, multiracial individuals are subject to treatment as misfits. This Part
aims to specify some of the unique harms faced by multiracial individuals that are left unaddressed by current equal protection
application.
As discussed earlier, the United States has a long history of
disapproving mixed-race relations—particularly because those
relations involved dilution of the White race—and continues to
exist in a state of uncertainty when it comes to multiracial individuals. When courts fail to recognize multiracial plaintiffs as
multiracial, they perpetuate confused and often negative ideas regarding racially mixed individuals. Inevitably, there is a substantial overlap between multiracial and monoracial animosity. However, as is true for any distinct group of marginalized individuals,
and particularly within the context of race, there are important
distinctions between single-race discrimination and multiracial
discrimination, including prejudices that only multiracial individuals face. The rest of this Part discusses some of those harms:
specifically, multiracial ostracism and harm directed toward multiracial individuals because of their mixed racial makeup. I argue
that in recognizing multiracial plaintiffs’ self-described identity,

108

See Leong, supra note 9, at 487.
Id.
110 For example, in a recent Pew Research Center survey, only 83% of respondents
agreed with the statement, “[I]t’s all right for blacks and whites to date.” Trends in Political Values and Core Attitudes: 1987–2007, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2007),
https://perma.cc/Z254-49EG. Presumably, then, nearly two out of every ten respondents
had reservations about interracial relationships, at least in the context of Black and White
people. See also Leong, supra note 9, at 494–95 (describing various public surveys regarding public attitudes toward interracial relationships).
111 See Leong, supra note 9, at 496–500 (describing the experiences of multiracial individuals being treated as “less than” in their respective groups).
109
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courts also recognize the unique problems faced by those who do
not fit within any monoracial category.
A. Multiracial Rejection in Society
A first harm faced by multiracial individuals is that they are
highly susceptible to the notion that they do not belong within
specified groups or even society more generally. A lack of recognition in court reinforces this notion. Unfortunately, this oppression
happens to multiracial individuals both because they are people
of color and by other individuals of color who do not fully accept
them.112 While a person who identifies as fully Black may at least
find refuge within the Black community, if not also society at
large, a multiracial individual may not receive the same welcome
into those groups. The fact that a multiracial person does not
clearly belong to one group may prevent acceptance into any
group. As explained by Leong, “[a] mixed-race person may be
viewed as polluted, defective, confusing or confused, passing,
threatening, or—in our diversity-obsessed society—as opportunistic, gaining an advantage by identifying with a group in which
he is at best a partial member.”113
Some scientific studies have shown that society tends to consider multiracial people more confused or defective than other
groups. For instance, in a psychological study, researchers gave a
scenario to 102 participants in which they were asked to identify
possible causes of a fictitious child’s misbehavior.114 The character
in the fictitious example was randomly assigned to be either a
White boy, a Black boy, or a boy with mixed-race parentage.115
Surprisingly, 85% of those assigned to the mixed-race boy attributed his behavioral problems to an identity crisis compared to
59% and 25% of those who had the Black and White boys, respectively.116 These ideas likely stem from deep-rooted beliefs in the
“inherent” inferiority of multiracial people. For instance, the
once-popular theory of “hybrid degeneracy” held that mixed-race
people were inferior to monoracial people because of decreased

112 See Maria P.P. Root, Within, Between, and Beyond Race, in RACIALLY MIXED
PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 26, at 3, 9.
113 Leong, supra note 9, at 484.
114 Kwame Owusu-Bempah, Confronting Racism in the Therapist’s Office, in MIXED
MESSAGES: MULTIRACIAL IDENTITIES IN THE “COLOR-BLIND” ERA, supra note 20, at 313, 318.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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physical, mental, emotional, and moral ability.117 Alternatively (or
perhaps additionally), it may just stem from the idea that multiracial people are inherently confused rather than confused because of the pressure society places on them.118 These ideas are
both wrong and offensive, yet they persist within society.119
Relatedly, another study of adolescents found that those who
identified with more than one race were more likely to be at risk
of feeling depressed, having trouble sleeping, skipping school,
smoking, and drinking alcohol.120 It is not unreasonable to think
these results may have been, at least partially, a consequence of
the external pressure and confusion many multiracial people feel
to choose one of their races as their self-identified race. Coincidingly, many times when a multiracial person is forced to choose
(or is told) the race she presents herself as, it misaligns with the
race or races with which she identifies in public.121 Further, the
physical appearance of a multiracial individual, in itself, can lead
to a variety of troublesome and uncomfortable encounters for the
multiracial person, from exaggerated emphases on appearance to
questions on the origin of physical features.122 Multiracial people
will experience situations in which their own sense of self is questioned more often than will individuals of a single race.123 In addition to the discomfort a multiracial person may feel when asked
“what” she is, the uneasiness may only continue when, upon giving an honest answer, the inquirer reacts with astonishment, declaring her disbelief because the multiracial person does not
“look” a certain way.124 It is experiences like these that exacerbate

117 Cynthia L. Nakashima, An Invisible Monster: The Creation and Denial of Mixed-Race
People in America, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 26, at 162, 165–66.
118 See Robin L. Miller, The Human Ecology of Multiracial Identity, in RACIALLY
MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 26, at 24, 31–34.
119 See Anita Kathy Foeman & Teresa Nance, From Miscegenation to Multiculturalism:
Perceptions and Stages of Interracial Relationship Development, 29 J. BLACK STUD. 540, 546–
48 (1999) (discussing researchers that have advocated for the position that non-Whites, including mixed-race individuals, are inferior to Whites as recently as 1994).
120 J. Richard Udry, Rose Maria Li & Janet Hendrickson-Smith, Health and Behavior
Risks of Adolescents with Mixed-Race Identity, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1865, 1868 (2003).
121 See Nakashima, supra note 117, at 176.
122 See Carla K. Bradshaw, Beauty and the Beast: On Racial Ambiguity, in RACIALLY
MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 26, at 77, 81–82.
123 See Raushanah Hud-Aleem & Jacqueline Countryman, Biracial Identity Development and Recommendations in Therapy, 5 PSYCHIATRY 37, 41–44 (2008).
124 See Bradshaw, supra note 122, at 83.

2021]

A Class of One

259

the alienation from mainstream values felt by multiracial
individuals.125
B. Multiracial-Targeted Hostility
Second, multiracial individuals often face prejudice because
of their racial composition itself, rather than, or in addition to, the
underlying negative assumptions that come with being multiracial.
Certainly, a half-White, half-Black individual might be subject to
racial slurs typically targeted to Black people,126 but she would
also face epithets unique to the multiracial category.127 The same
is true when it comes to discriminatory behavior targeted toward
someone because of her racial composition. Some might act with
hostility toward multiracial individuals for no other reason except
for the fact that they are multiracial. In one notable case from
Utah, a school bus driver was alleged to have racially discriminated against a 14-year-old biracial student when he apparently
intentionally closed the door on the child as he was exiting the
vehicle and began to drive, dangling the child along for 150 feet.128
To make matters even worse, there had been at least three other
reports against that driver alleging racial discrimination against
biracial individuals.129
In a study conducted by the Pew Research Center, researchers found that because of their multiracial identity, more than half
of multiracial individuals have been subject to jokes or slurs; more
than 15% were teased or made fun of as a child; just under half
had received poor service in restaurants or other businesses; and
33% had been treated unfairly by an employer.130 These hostile
interactions may be the result of inappropriate judgments made
by people in general or even critical assumptions made by minorities, who often see multiracial people as “traitors” or
125 See Cookie White Stephan, Mixed-Heritage Individuals: Ethnic Identity and Trait
Characteristics, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 26, at 50, 58–59.
126 See, e.g., Robinson, 894 F.3d at 823–26; see also Leong, supra note 9, at 495 n.105.
127 See, e.g., Leong, supra note 9, at 496 n.106 (listing examples pertinent to the halfBlack, half-White individual, including “mulatto,” “oreo,” and “chigger,” and more generally used terms including “half-breed,” “mutt,” and “zebra”).
128 Courtney Tanner, A Biracial Utah Boy Was Shut in the Doors of a School Bus and
Left Dangling Outside as It Drove Forward. Now His Family Is Suing., SALT LAKE TRIB.
(May 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/23TH-9G2C.
129 Id. When the bus driver was asked by the media if he was racist, he responded by
saying, “Not at all. No. Look at my dog. He’s as black as could be.” Id. This in no way
proves that he was hostile toward multiracial people simply because they existed. However, it is plausible that was the case.
130 See Parker et al., supra note 30.
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“whitewashed.” As some people act discriminatorily toward Black
people simply because of their skin color, some may act unfairly
toward multiracial people because they are not “pure” in terms of
their racial composition.
Relatedly, multiracial people are subject to the unique and
complex phenomenon of discrimination based on “situational
race,”131 which involves a person “act[ing] upon prejudice against
a mixed-race individual under the false belief that the person is
of a certain racial background.”132 For example, a half-Mexican,
half-Filipina woman may suffer racial discrimination as a perceived Middle Eastern woman, although she has no identification
with the Middle East.133 To be sure, discrimination of any sort is
inexcusable, but discrimination based on a characteristic with
which a person does not even identify is perhaps even more deplorable because of the increased lack of recognition the discriminated person feels. As current recognition of multiracial plaintiffs in court stands, these acute experiences go unaddressed with
the identities of the plaintiffs. Without recognizing who a person
is, a court can hardly be expected to understand and remedy what
that person is experiencing.
C. Remedying Multiracial Harms Through Recognition
In accord with the notion that multiracial people deserve acknowledgment, it is only by properly recognizing multiracial individuals as just that—multiracial—that courts (and, subsequently, we as a society) validate their existence and experiences
as a group and individually. As explained by one author, “[b]eing
able to control racial representations of oneself or one’s group
marks a securing of symbolic power in the face of a racial system
that relies on symbolic means for the maintenance of inequality.”134 Recognizing multiracial people as such is powerful in that
it aids in eliminating the discriminatory racial hierarchical system that, for so long, has oppressed non-Whites—even more

131 See, e.g., Maria P.P. Root, The Multiracial Experience: Racial Borders as a Significant Frontier in Race Relations, in THE MULTIRACIAL EXPERIENCE: RACIAL BORDERS AS
THE NEW FRONTIER, at xiii, xxi (Maria P.P. Root ed., 1996).
132 Ken Nakasu Davison, Note, The Mixed-Race Experience: Treatment of Racially
Miscategorized Individuals Under Title VII, 12 ASIAN L.J. 161, 180 (2005).
133 Id. at 180–81.
134 Benjamin Bailey, Black and Latino: Dominican Americans Negotiate Racial
Worlds, in MIXED MESSAGES: MULTIRACIAL IDENTITIES IN THE “COLOR-BLIND” ERA, supra
note 20, at 285, 295.
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notably within the legal system.135 Inversely, though, misaddressing or failing to address entirely the racial identity of multiracial
individuals can have detrimental effects on the mental well-being
of those individuals.
One may wonder why the more obvious possibility of adding
a separate class of “multiracial people” to the generally accepted
racial categories136 would not be enough. Importantly, creating a
multiracial category might cause animosity among racial groups
or might perpetuate existing racial classifications by deeming
multiracial individuals as the result of two people of “pure”
races.137 Additionally, creating a single classification for all multiracial people ignores the vast differences among multiracial individuals. One should hardly argue that the experiences of a BlackWhite, mixed-race individual would mirror the experiences of an
Asian-White, mixed-race individual.138 Instead, adopting a separate class-of-one approach would avoid these difficult problems
that would result from creating a “multiracial” category in addition to other racial categories.
Ultimately, under the current application of equal protection
doctrine to multiracial individuals, courts fall short. By incorrectly categorizing the racial identity of—and thereby refusing to
acknowledge the unique experiences of and harms faced by—multiracial people, mixed-race people do not receive equal protection
under the law.
IV. COURT RECOGNITION OF MULTIRACIAL PLAINTIFFS AS A
CLASS OF ONE
Because of the unique recognition problems faced by multiracial individuals, I argue courts should be willing to expand the
equal protection doctrine of class-of-one plaintiffs to assess the
discrimination claims of multiracial individuals. Doing so would
acknowledge multiracial plaintiffs in a way that allows the plaintiffs to assert their identity in the way they see fit, even if use of
the doctrine results in few changes in legal outcomes. This Part
explains the historical justifications and applications of the
135 Concededly, recognition of multiracial individuals as distinct might further entrench the racial hierarchies that have persisted throughout U.S. history. A multiracial
identity might be viewed as an intermediary between ideal Whiteness and despicable nonWhiteness.
136 See supra note 16.
137 See Leong, supra note 9, at 546–47.
138 See id. at 547.
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class-of-one rule before describing how courts might be able to
apply it to the cases of multiracial plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court’s slowly expanding understanding of
equal protection inevitably forced the Court to address the validity of the class-of-one doctrine. Specifically, it was asked to determine whether single individuals—those that do not identify as
members of any prejudiced group—would qualify under equal
protection. As explained by Hortensia S. Carreira, this “latest
frontier” in equal protection jurisprudence was inherently controversial because of its contradiction to the law’s tendency to classify people.139 By allowing class-of-one claims, the Court would
“run[ ] the risk of constitutionalizing every arguably different application of law and requiring absolutely equal treatment in every
instance.”140 Despite this risk, however, the Court found class-ofone claims to be constitutional, at least in some contexts. In its
first class-of-one case, Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,141
the Court remarkably held that individuals that do not identify
with some discriminated-against class can still assert discrimination claims as a class of one by alleging they were treated differently from others similarly situated.142
This Part proceeds by first discussing the justifications and
structure of the class-of-one doctrine. It then discusses the Court’s
application of the class-of-one doctrine and how courts might apply the doctrine to multiracial plaintiffs. Importantly, implementation of the class-of-one doctrine in multiracial plaintiffs’ cases
would not be seamless—some alterations would be required. Still,
those changes would be minor and worthwhile considering the potential benefits to be acquired by multiracial individuals and,
more generally, society.
A. Justifications for the Class-of-One Doctrine
In her article, Carreira extensively illustrates the justifications behind allowing class-of-one equal protection claims.143
First, she explains that the doctrine is consistent with a textualist
reading of the Equal Protection Clause.144 Unlike in the other
139 Hortensia S. Carreira, Protecting the “Class of One”, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
331, 339–40 (2001).
140 Id. at 340.
141 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
142 Id. at 446–47.
143 See Carreira, supra note 139, at 340–51.
144 Id. at 340–41.
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Reconstruction Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause makes
no mention of racial groups or slavery.145 For instance, the Thirteenth Amendment deems illegitimate “slavery [and] involuntary
servitude”146—both historically intertwined with Black people.
Similarly, the Fifteenth Amendment protects the right to vote for
those discriminated against “on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”147 In sharp contrast, the Fourteenth
Amendment offers to “any person within [the United States’] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”148 Consequently, there
is reason to believe that even those who do not fit within a concretely defined discrete and insular group may be able to assert
equal protection claims.
Second, Carreira suggests that the language the Court has
used in its equal protection decisions—specifically, hesitating to
offer equal protection only to groups of marginalized individuals—
leaves the possibility of classes of one open.149 Brown, for example,
was decided without any mention of the suspect classification of
racial groups.150 And as explained by Carreira, subsequent cases
like City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center151 even seemed to
hold that a group was not required at all.152 In that case, the Court
said that the Equal Protection Clause is “essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”153
Finally, Carreira suggests that public choice theory—or examining equal protection in light of public processes—supports
class-of-one claims.154 The class-of-one doctrine, she posits, does
not limit the scope of “discrete and insular” minorities protected;
rather, it aligns with public choice theory in “welcom[ing] judicial
intervention when democratic processes are unlikely to check government action . . . vis-à-vis an individual person.”155 This includes individuals we might consider vulnerable that would otherwise not be protected under equal protection. Especially
because individuals are typically too powerless to effect change
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on their own, it seems fitting for the law to cover them apart from
group identities.156
B. Structure of the Class-of-One Doctrine
Given the desire to avoid an excessive number of unfounded
equal protection cases, the structure of class-of-one equal protection claims differs from the typical equal protection claim. In order to bring a class-of-one claim, a plaintiff with no membership
in a distinct class or group relevant to that claim must allege that
she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated.157 Notably, the “similarly situated” requirement
has often demanded “an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they compare themselves.”158 Further, the plaintiff must show that there is no rational basis for differential treatment.159 This is where the classof-one doctrine substantially differs from established race-based
antidiscrimination law. Instead of the traditional strict scrutiny
application to racial discrimination claims, the Court has, so far,
only applied rational basis review to class-of-one claims. As one
court explained: “While the principal target of the equal protection clause is discrimination against members of vulnerable
groups, the clause protects [a] class-of-one plaintiff[ ] victimized
by ‘the wholly arbitrary act.’” 160 However, courts have limited the
scope of the treatment that qualifies under the class-of-one equal
protection doctrine. Importantly, the discriminatory treatment
must be shown to be an act of “illegitimate animus” as opposed to
mere “inadvertence or some kind of permissible governmental
classification.”161 Even more, the differential treatment must be
because of that individual’s membership (or perceived membership) in the class of one—singling out an individual, in itself, does
not create a class.162
A class-of-one plaintiff may demonstrate that the governmental action lacks a rational basis in two ways.163 They can either
156

See id.
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“‘negativ[e] every conceivable basis which might support’ the government action or [ ] demonstrat[e] that the challenged government action was motivated by animus or ill-will.”164 Ultimately,
plaintiffs cannot succeed on an equal protection claim simply by
stating the words “class of one”; rather, they must point to evidence that other, similarly situated individuals were treated
more favorably.165
Importantly, however, courts have distinguished between appropriate class-of-one cases and those that necessarily must be
dismissed because of the need for discretion. As discussed in more
detail in the next Section, in Engquist v. Oregon Department of
Agriculture,166 the Supreme Court explained that some state actions inherently involve discretionary decision-making.167 In
those cases, “allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling
out of a particular person would undermine the very discretion
that such state officials are entrusted to exercise.”168 This is particularly true in the context of employment decisions where,
sometimes, individualized decisions are made in a seemingly arbitrary manner.169 Still, the Court in Engquist and the lower
courts since that decision have regularly upheld plaintiffs’ abilities to bring a class-of-one equal protection claim before the court
when they feel they have been irrationally and unjustifiably discriminated against.
1. Application of the class-of-one doctrine.
Admittedly, few class-of-one cases have found their way to
the Supreme Court. Still, an analysis of those cases is instructive
in showing when the Court has accepted class-of-one claims. In
1918, the Sioux Bridge Company was surprised to discover that
the county, in taxing its bridge in South Sioux City, assessed the
property at 100%. This element of surprise was justified, considering the issued assessment had historically been only 55%, and,
further, the 55% assessment continued to be issued to other owners of similar property in the county.170 The Nebraska Supreme
Court had previously affirmed the district court’s ruling for the
164
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defendant, finding that the assessment was arbitrary, though
reasonable.171 When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, Chief Justice William Howard Taft, writing for the court,
held that the lower court’s affirmation upheld a plausible violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by taxing property in the same
class non-uniformly.172 In doing so, the Court seemed to expand
its understanding of antidiscrimination law—according to the
Court, the Sioux Bridge Company, a single entity not belonging
to any specific prejudiced class, could allege unlawful discriminatory practices on its own.
Sixty-six years later in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Commissioner,173 the Court again allowed a small “class”
of landowners not belonging to a specified prejudiced group to
pursue an equal protection claim when their land was unjustifiably taxed higher than similar property.174 Specifically, the Court
held that state failure to achieve rough equality in taxation
among similarly situated property owners—instead using “arbitrary” and “capricious” taxation—violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.175 In doing so, the Court
said, “The [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause . . . protects the individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory
treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the
same class.”176
It was not until 2000 that the Supreme Court explicitly articulated what is now the class-of-one doctrine. In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,177 respondent Grace Olech claimed the Village of
Willowbrook violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it demanded she grant a thirty-threefoot easement in exchange for access to the municipal water supply.178 Olech contended that the easement demand was “irrational
and wholly arbitrary” when compared to the fifteen-foot easement
the Village sought from other property owners.179 Olech claimed
the Village was specifically targeting her because of a previous
171
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lawsuit she had filed (and won) against it.180 Although Olech was
the only member of the “class” she sought to sue under, the Court
recognized claims by classes of one in which “the plaintiff alleges
that she has been intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”181 Consequently, it upheld the lower court’s
determination that Olech could recover under equal protection
doctrine.182
Eight years after it first explicitly recognized the class-of-one
doctrine, the Supreme Court issued its last word to date on the
topic, substantially narrowing the doctrine in the process. In
Engquist, the plaintiff, Anup Engquist, was laid off from her position within the Oregon Department of Agriculture after repeated altercations with her supervisors and coworkers.183
Engquist alleged her employer had violated the Equal Protection
Clause both by discriminating against her on the basis of her race,
sex, and national origin and by acting “arbitrar[ily], vindictive[ly], and malicious[ly].”184 Although the Court reaffirmed the
existence of the class-of-one doctrine, it refused to find that it was
appropriate within state employment decisions and other discretionary decision-making areas.185 In doing so, it analogized employment decisions to a traffic officer giving tickets—an officer
can only give tickets to some, not all, speeding drivers, yet we
would hesitate to allow an equal protection claim for that “class
of one” ticketed driver.186 Allowing an equal protection claim on
the ground that one person was given a ticket (or fired) and not
others, “even if for no discernable or articulable reason, would be
incompatible with the discretion inherent in the challenged action.”187 Consequently, in contexts requiring discretionary choices
(mostly clearly present in employment decisions), the Court found
that the class-of-one doctrine was inapplicable.
The Court’s decision in Olech forced lower courts to reconcile
precedent with an influx of potential litigation. Some courts opted
for higher pleading standards, while others required an
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“extremely high”188 level of similarity between plaintiffs189 and
those treated more fairly or proof of animus.190 Post-Engquist,
lower courts, unsurprisingly, began dismissing class-of-one employment cases.191 Additionally, many of those same courts began
to analyze cases through the discretionary decision-making lens
used in Engquist, making class-of-one claims substantially more
difficult for plaintiffs.192 Nevertheless, class-of-one claims still
may provide a successful framework for multiracial plaintiffs in
that they would allow individuals with a mixed racial composition
to be recognized as distinct by courts.
2. Application of the class-of-one doctrine to multiracial
plaintiffs.
To adequately address the concerns of multiracial individuals, courts should apply the class-of-one approach to the claims of
mixed-race individuals. Doing so would not entail instituting a
new racial category in equal protection claims per se, but would
accommodate the unique identities brought forward by multiracial plaintiffs who, as of now, are only partially recognized by
courts’ understanding of racial discrimination. Additionally,
recognition of multiracial individuals as classes of one would allow courts to have a more open understanding of race and discrimination by viewing discriminatory experiences from the perspective of those who do not cleanly fit within a traditional racial
group. Perhaps more importantly though, allowing multiracial
plaintiffs to be heard as classes of one would encourage courts to
recognize plaintiffs’ identities as they view them instead of how
society would narrowly construe them. This Section proceeds by
describing a hypothetical case in which a multiracial plaintiff alleges an equal protection violation as a class of one. I then discuss
some natural limitations that would flow from permitting multiracial individuals to use the class-of-one doctrine. Finally, I assess
188 William D. Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One/Failing Equal Protection, 55 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 435, 445–46 (2013).
189 See, e.g., Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1264 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that
“[t]o be similarly situated, the comparators must be prima facie identical in all relevant respects” (emphasis in original) (quotation marks omitted)); Ruston, 610 F.3d at 59 (establishing a higher pleading standard); Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2019).
190 See Araiza, supra note 188, at 445–46.
191 Id. at 450; see also, e.g., Carney v. Miller, 842 N.W.2d 782, 796–97 (Neb. 2014).
192 See Araiza, supra note 188, at 450–51. As explained by Professor William Araiza,
courts began dismissing claims based on parole board decisions, government contracting,
and other law enforcement decisions.
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potential counterarguments to the claim that multiracial plaintiffs should be able to assert class-of-one equal protection claims.
Notably, the class-of-one doctrine would not cleanly and perfectly apply in the context of multiracial individuals. At least
some minor alterations would be needed to ensure that multiracial people, as a discrete and insular minority, would remain protected under the law. Perhaps most importantly, this new understanding of racial discrimination under the class-of-one doctrine
would only apply to those multiracial individuals who desire it.
Race is an incredibly personal subject that courts should avoid
determining on behalf of parties.193 Accordingly, traditional understandings of monoracial discrimination would still be an option if a multiracial plaintiff preferred to identify with a traditional racial group. Identifying as a class of one would be opt-in
only. To exemplify how a court might apply this class-of-one mentality to multiracial plaintiffs, consider a theoretical case in which
a multiracial plaintiff brings an equal protection claim.
In this hypothetical case, the plaintiff brings a suit against
the government, claiming it violated her right to equal protection
under the law. In doing so, she would allege that the discriminator treated her differently than those similarly situated because
of her multiracial identity. Notably, while a high degree of similarity would still need to be shown between the plaintiff and those
similarly situated, this would proceed in a fashion that is in many
ways indistinguishable from any other racial discrimination
case.194 The plaintiff could then go on to strengthen her claim with
concrete evidence of racial discrimination. At this point, the court
would deviate from the traditional structure of the class-of-one
doctrine. Instead of using only rational basis review as courts normally would in a class-of-one case, the court would employ strict
scrutiny, as the plaintiff’s case involves the use of suspect racial
classifications.195 The state, then, would be burdened with showing that the governmental actions were narrowly tailored to
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achieve a particular government interest.196 If it fails to do so, the
plaintiff would then win on her claim.
Unfortunately, because of the nature of class-of-one cases, it
is still highly impracticable for even multiracial class-of-one cases
within the employment context to proceed. Here, too, it would
likely be inappropriate for courts to review cases involving purely
discretionary decisions, as the Court held in Engquist. In those
cases, multiracial plaintiffs would need to seek recourse under existing equal protection doctrine, if possible. While many equal
protection claims will involve employment decisions, there still
remain ample government decisions that could be challenged under class-of-one equal protection claims. For instance, claims
based on discriminatory statutes or even quasi-discretionary decisions (like those made in Olech or Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal)
might be challenged. Moreover, the use of the class-of-one doctrine would be a step in the right direction in recognizing the experiences of mixed-race individuals and would assist in breaking
open the rigid racial classifications that have traditionally been
the default in our society. As explained by Professors Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, rigid racial paradigms are harmful in at
least two ways: first, they often purport racial progress as a “linear progression” by supporting the notion that Race X may not
have the same benefits as Race Y but at least it is better off than
Race Z; second (and particularly in cases of binary racial categorization), they harm minority groups by weakening interracial
solidarity and increasing reliance on White approval.197 In other
words, by rejecting rigid racial categories, courts would aid in
eradicating the long-lasting effects of our nation’s history of white
supremacy.
Instead of viewing multiracial plaintiffs as non-White, monoracial individuals (as is done too often), courts would be forced to
view multiracial plaintiffs as just that—multiracial. Doing so
would be symbolic in that it would lead us to question the racial
categorizations we have historically used. Further, by remedying
the silencing of multiracial plaintiffs through a class-of-one application, their “[s]tories [will] give them a voice and reveal that
other people have similar experiences. Stories can name a type of
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discrimination (e.g., microaggressions, unconscious discrimination, or structural racism); once named, it can be combated.”198
In response to this proposal, some might argue that allowing
multiracial individuals to be recognized as a class of one would
allow for innumerable claims to be filed that otherwise could not
be. This may be of particular concern considering the rise of genetic testing, in which many White-identifying people discover
they are multiracial.199 However, the nature of the class-of-one
doctrine makes it no less difficult to succeed—and perhaps even
more so—than a traditional equal protection claim. As a single
person alleging discriminatory actions, the plaintiff may need to
do more to show that the behavior was truly discriminatory and
not random or a matter of discretion. Further, demonstrating a
difference in treatment from similarly situated people could involve exhaustive effort. Even if a flood of claims is the result,
though, that might just be a consequence that we must accept as
a multicultural society.
Another challenge to this approach might be that increased
recourse for equal protection violations will lead to tension within
the multiracial community, including through the existence of
“distancing.” In one article, Professor Christine Hickman describes distancing as “the creation of unnecessary and pernicious
distinctions between light-skinned and dark-skinned” people.200 If
some racial minorities (multiracial individuals) are permitted extra opportunities to seek legal recourse, so the argument goes,
monoracial individuals will harbor increased animosity toward
those individuals. This critique mistakenly assumes that current
relations between monoracial and multiracial people are satisfactory. In many cases, as shown in previous Parts, multiracial individuals are ostracized from groups that they are at least partial
members of. In fact, it seems just as likely that allowing multiracial individuals to identify as separate and unique will positively affect interracial-group relations. Implementing the classof-one doctrine for multiracial plaintiffs might encourage
198
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monoracial minority groups to see multiracial individuals, not as
confused or defective, but as unique combinations of multiple, full
racial identities. Further, it seems reasonable to suspect that any
sort of positive change for one group of racial minorities would
likely further the overall progress for all racial minorities. Especially given the nature of my proposal, which demands greater
and more accurate recognition of minority plaintiffs, such a
change might benefit all minority plaintiffs in changing the habits and perspectives of courts and society.
CONCLUSION
As Professor of sociology G. Reginald Daniel explained, “[o]ur
society is racially illiterate in general, and the greatest illiteracy
is to be in the presence of a multiracial person.”201 So, too, are our
courts racially illiterate when they misidentify mixed-race
plaintiffs. Under the courts’ current understanding and application of equal protection, the unique identities and experiences of
mixed-race people go unrecognized and perhaps even unaddressed. As society changes and becomes increasingly more diverse, it is crucial that our courts, too, reflect the people they intend to protect through the law. An effective way in which courts
can remedy this problem is to consider multiracial plaintiffs as a
class of one when they sue under equal protection.
Some might argue that allowing class-of-one claims could
completely undermine current understandings of race and discrimination. While this could certainly be a possibility, one must
consider the possibility that we live in a society whose racial categorization schemes ought to be questioned.202 Rather than perceiving race as clear-cut (and often binary), it might be more useful and accurate to perceive racial categories as fluid.
Nevertheless, existing categories would remain untouched by this
new application of the class-of-one doctrine. The altered understanding of multiracial equal protection claims would serve as an
addition to—not a substitute for—current equal protection jurisprudence.

201 Kristal Brent Zook, Universities Are Still Struggling to Provide for Mixed-Race
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In the past, the judicial system has played a vital role in
shaping American thought and opinion on race. After the Court’s
holding in Brown, Americans thought about race differently and
eventually adopted an overwhelmingly egalitarian attitude.203
Through a landmark decision, the Court set a model for society. I
argue that by adopting a class-of-one approach, courts will once
again lead society by acknowledging the often-marginalized identities of the multiracial plaintiffs before them instead of viewing
the experiences of multiracial individuals as typical for those of
the groups to which they belong. As a result and as will prove
crucial to our ever-evolving society, courts—and conceivably society at large—might begin to affirm the self-identities of multiracial individuals.

203 See Clayborne Carson, Two Cheers for Brown v. Board of Education, 91 J. AM.
HIST. 26, 26 (2004) (“The Court’s ruling against school segregation encouraged African
Americans to believe that the entire structure of white supremacy was illegitimate and
legally vulnerable.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Did Brown Matter?, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 26,
2004), https://perma.cc/N2JA-VQC4 (“Brown ruled that, under the Constitution, states
may not humiliate a class of people. . . . It may have taken a while, but this ruling, at least,
has stuck.”).

